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On Review:
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History
of the Supreme Court of the United States,
Volume VI, Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864-88, Part One.
By Charles Fairman.
The Macmilla·n Company, New York: 1971. Pp. 1,540, i·nduding index:
$30.00 ($25.00 in subscription).

Reviewed by David S. Bogen

Editor's Note: After receiving his LL.B. from
Harvard, Professor Bogen clerked for Justice
Jacob Spiegel of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. He then received an Arthur
Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Fellowship to
New York University Law School, where he
earned his LL.M. He spent two more years in
New York as an associate in a large firm before he came to the University of Maryland
School of Law where he is now an Associate
Professor.

The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History

In 1935, an unusual thing happened- the
U.S. received a bequest:
... All of the rest, residue and remainder
of my pr>operty of whatsoever nature,
wheresoever situate, of which I may die
seized and possessed, or in which I may
have an interest at the time of my death,
I give, devise, and bequeath to the United
States .•.
The remainder of the estate of the ninetythree year old Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, amounted to more than $263,000. About
a month after the recording of the will, President Franklin D. Roosevelt, somewhat befud·
dled with what to do with the money, sent a
message to Congress praising Justice Holmes
and suggesting that the gift be used in a manner worthy of its donor. The President rec-

ommended that the bequest be set aside in a
special fund and, "at a later date be devoted
to purposes which will effectively promote the
contribution which law can make to the national welfare."
Three years later Congress ad;opted a public
resolution creating a nine-member committee,
composed of three members of the House,
Senate and Supreme Court each, to investigate
the possible uses of the bequest. The committee's ultimate recommendations were never
consummated, as World War II foreed a deferral of its plans. Subsequent to the war, however, the committee, then chaired by Chief
Justice Earl Warren, proposed Jthe adoption of
a bill to create the Oliver Wendell Holmes
Devise Fund. A 1955 Congressional Act passed
in accordance with the committee's recommendations established a Permanent Committee to administer the fund, the purpose of
which was :to prepare and publish a history of
the Supreme Court of the United States.
President Eisenhower designated the first
four appointees to the Permanent Committee
in 1956 (the Librarian of Congress serves as
the ex officio chairman) and later that same
year Paul A. Freund of Harvard Law School
was appointed Editor-in-Chief of the multivolume work. After a careful study of contemporary legal scholars, invitations were extended to various authors, all experts in the
sundry historical periods for which they contracted to write. The authors began their incredible. tasks shortly after the Committee had
finished negotiations with the Macmillan Company in 1958 to publish the definitive history.
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The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History,
to be published in eleven volumes with a one
volume supplement of charts, photographs and
biographical sketches, is intended to fill an
incredible void in legal literature by setting
the vital work of the court against a comprehensive, interpretative backdrop of political,
social and economic history. It is also meant
to be an expert examination of the professional task of the court and an analysis of the
institution as it settles specific controversies
through the process of collective decisionmaking.
Charles Fairman, Professor of Law Emeritus at Harvard Law School and author of
Volume VI, Reconstruction and Reunion, 186488, Part One, received his A.B. and A.M.
from the University of Illinois (1918 and 1920,
respectively), his Ph.D. in g.overnment and
S.J.D. from Harvard (1926 and 1938, respectively) and his LL.B. from the University of
London (1934). Aside from numerous fellowships and other activities during his distinguished career, Professor Fairman has
written thre.e books and numerous law review
articles on the various aspects of the Supreme
Court and its history. Presently, he is in the
process of writing the second par.t of Reconstruction and Reunion, which will be published
as Volume VII.

this questioning of the relevance of history.
The tracking of the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment demonstrates that history
may hold no answers for us today, and Fairman's discussion of Jones v. Mayer 2 suggests
that, whatever answers history can provide,
they may be ignored if they are not convenient.
Fairman's attack on Justice Black's theory
that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates
the Bill of Rights is well-known. A glance at
Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson's speech
moving to strike the privileges and immunities
clause may suffice to illustrate Fairman's contention: "I think it quite objectionable to provide [the privileges and immunities provision],
simply because I do not understand what will
be the effect of that." 3 Fairman notes that
Johnson "had participated in the Joint Committee [which drafted the Amendment] ... had
heard Howard's presentation [relied on by Justice Black to show that the Bill of Rights was
intended to be incorporated by the Fourteenth]
... and still did not understand what the effect
of the clause would be. Coming from him, that
amounted to a certificate that, for purposes of
litigation, the privileges and immunities clause
did not have a definite meaning." 4 This historical analysis does not foreclose Justice
Black's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but simply reveals it to be one of
many permissible choices for breathing essence
into a vague and historically undefined concept.

e have waited a. long time for the first
Wvolumes
of the History of the Supreme

Court of the United States, but the delay has
been amply justified in the case of Professor
Charles Fairman's Reconstruction and Reunion,
1864-88, Part One by its superb quality. 1 This
first portion of his work covers ess.entially the
period from 1864-1873 when Salmon P. Chase
was Chief Justice. The primary focus of the
book is on the Court in its relationship to the
problems of reconstruction: the enactment of
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments,
the post-war status of the secessionist states
and the legality of measures connected with the
war.
Professor Fairman has created a rich tapestry of the Supreme Court in the Context of
Reconstruction. The fabric is the letters,
speeches, and other writings of the period. He
weaves together physical descriptions of the
Court and excerpts from Congressional debate,
household details of the justices' lives and the
tactics of those opposed to Reconstruction. The
particular attention to small details, combined
with an appreciation for the larger events
which transpired, provides a remarkable portrait of the Court at a critical historical period.
The book is unquestionably the finest existing account of the Court in the Reconstruction
period. But who cares what happened a century ago? Two items from the work suggest

Professor Fairman has
created a
rich tapestry of the
Supreme Court in the
Context of
Reconstruction.
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Such history, in a sense, frees us from history,
permitting our changing society to impart
new civilization into its basic governmental
structure.
Sometimes, however, history does have an
answer. What, though, is the value of an answer to a historical question? If it is inconvenient, it may be ignored. Thus, the Supreme
Court held in Jones v. Mayer that the Civil
Rjghts Act of 1866 applied to private discrimination in the sale of housing. Fairman
demonstrates that the language from Congressional debates, quoted by the Jones majority, does not support their statutory conclusions and that there were clear expressions by
leading Congressmen that the Act applied
solely to discrimination by the states. For example, Representative Shellabarger of Ohio
said: "The bill does not reach mere private
wrongs, but only those done under color of
State authority ... its whole force is expended
in defeating an attempt, under State laws, to
deprive races and members thereof as such of
the rights enumerated in this act. This is the
whole of it.'' 5
The history belieing Jones, much of which
appears in Justice Harlan's dissent, seems irrefutable. The Court, however, avoids it in part
byfocusing on the enormity of the injustice of
private discrimination. The highest court "al-

But the McCardle
experience suggests that
significant
Congressional power
over the Court may not
be so bad.

lowed itself to believe impossible things - as
though the dawning enlightenment of 1968
could be ascribed to the Congress of a century
agone.'' 6 The depth of Fairman's feeling of
betrayal by the Court appears in part in a footnote wherein he suggests that the Court's performance in Jones is comparable to Lewis
Carroll's Through the Looking Glass: "Alice
laughed. 'There's no use trying,' she said: 'one
can't believe impossible things.' 'I daresay you
haven't had much practice,' said the Queen." 7
Why not believe "impossible things"? The
housing law of the 1866 Act, as the Supreme
Court and several lower courts have interpreted
it, is a good and valuable law even if it is not
what the Congressmen thought they were enacting. The parallel with Fairman's own views
on the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and the case of Ex parte McCardle 8 is
striking. In McCardle, the Court acknowledged
Congressional power to remove from its jurisdiction a case posing issues of the constitutionality of Reconstruction. Shielded from a
potentially adverse judicial ruling on Reconstruction, Congress was able to force the
secessionist states to ratify the Fourteenth
Amendment as a condition for readmission to
political power and relief from military rule.
A larger measure of racial equality was
achieved by means which are generally disapproved. "Military administration of the Southern States has seemed unconstitutional on its
face. Men have found it easy to condemn Congressional defiance of the Court as a partisan
excess - and then have gone on to praise the
new freedom secured by the Fourteenth
Amendment, with never a thought for its inconsistency. But to be honest with the facts,
one may not extol the benefit yet repugn the
cost."9
In the discussion of McCardle, another aspect
of history is revealed - history as a basis for
judging institutions. It would be foolish to
accept the premise that Congressional power
over the Court brought greater freedom to the
nation as proof of the conclusion that such
power should exist. That same power may
render the Fourteenth Amendment's promise
illusory, as evidenced by recent prohibitions on
lower court busing orders. But the McCardle
experience. suggests that significant Congressional power over the Court may not be so bad.
The elimination of Supreme Court jurisdiction
can be accomplished with less votes than those
necessary to initiate a constitutional amendment, but it is so fraught with problems of
internal morality and anomalous law that it
may well have fewer supporters than a constitutional amendment. Thus, its use may prevent
unwise constitutional tampering as a temporary expedient for temporary problems. But
in the long run, total refusal to let the Court
play a role in interpreting our national moral
principles will lead to further loss of confidence in the judiciary and in our moral selves.10
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This notion brings us back to Jones v. Mayer
for, if the Court is to be looked upon as the
guardian of our national moral principles, as
expressed in the Constitution, it is essential
that i.ts integrity be established. As Fairman
says with reference to the McCardle case,
"[s] ubmission to the Court as the true voice
of the Constitution presupposes an established
confidence in the lofty disinterestedness of its
members-something that at the time of M cCardle the Court did not enjoy and did not
deserve." 11 Thus a failure to be honest with
history and to respect even the unhappy facts
threaten the integrity of the Court and, in turn,
undercut its ability to uphold the ideals of the
equal protection clause and ..to apply them to
the segregated school systems of America.
History can free us from the tyranny of an
imagined past, or it can bind us to it. Nevertheles·s, history is cfar more frequently useful 'as one of the many aids to today's decision-making. By understanding how we arrived at our present situation, we may better
choose among the alternatives available to us.
Providing such an understanding is Professor
Fairman's forte. Many pages are lovingly devoted, with painstaking description and analysis, to.the municipal bond cases. Here, Fairman
does the most extensive new original research;
pointing out how neglected these decisions
were. But the neglect has hardly been unin1

tentional. Since the principal Supreme Court
cases on municipal bonds in this era arose out
of diversity jurisdiction and applied a concept
of federal law, they are valueless as precedents today. This mode of proceeding was
repudiated in Erie v. Tompkins 12 and the decisions before it would seem to be merely historical curiosities. So why the curiosity for
Fairman? The bond cases loomed large and
were, in fact, the largest single type of case
on the docket of the Court. A true feel for. the
functioning of the Court could. hardly be attained by ignoring such matters. Butthat alone
is insufficient to account for their extensive
treatment by Fairman. The cases, relics to be
sure, suggest the. impetus behind Erie v.
Tompkins and serve as cautio.ns aga;inst a
reversion by :15ederal and state courts to separate rules of decision in diversity cases. The
unnecessary tangles of federal and state law
that made Iowa· and Missouri sharply resist
federal dominance breathe a warndng of the
wisdom of Brandeis. But even further, these
cases show the Supreme Court operating in
a speci'al and, it can be hoped, aberrational
way. Here "all other policies or values or
interests were submerged in a high tide of
feeling on the Court about a particular social
cause." 13 Thus Justice Miller wrote to his
brother-in-law: "Our court or a majority of it
are, if not monomaniacs, as much bigots and
fanatics on that subject [contracts against a
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municipal corporation] as is the most unhesitating Mahemodan in regard to his religion.
In four cases out of five the case is decided
when it is seen by the pleadings that it is a
suit to enforce a contract against a city, or
town, or a county. If there is a written instrument, its· validity is a foregone conclusion."14
Thus, a curious relic leads to greater appreciation of our federal diversity jurisdiction and
to an awareness of how emotions may sway a
court. Indeed, much of this history establishes,
by inference, a classical model of judicial conduct and demonstrates the problems created
by departure from the model.

Adherence to the classical judicial model
does 'not, in and of itself, bring respect
to the Court. Such respect also depends upon
the perception of the justices, the condition
of society a.nd a degree of good luck.
For example, the classical model dictates
that the judge refrain from deciding issues not
before him. Fairman makes this point in his
examination of the Court's opinion in Ex parte
Milligan. 15 The issue here was the legality of
imprisonment of the civilian Milligan pursuant
to a military trial in a state which did not
secede from the Union. The concurring opinion
of Chase stated, in effect, that existing legislation required trial by civilian courts. Justice
Davis, for the Court, went beyond Chase to
hold that the trial by the military commission
was unconstitutional. In fact, Davis went even
further, stating that, although admittedly Congress had not authorized Milligan's trial, if it
had attempted to so authorize, "Congress could
grant no such power." 16 This unabashed dictum
served notice that a majority of the Court
would consider Congress powerless to establish
military commissions for the trial of invasions
of civil rights. When the issue of Congressional
power to establish military rule in the rebel
states arose after the war, Congress was unwilling to let the court decide it. Fairman concludes that "the needless breadth of the language in Milligan should be reckoned as the
starting point in the sequence of actions and
reactions that led to the statute of March 27,
1868, whereby Congress took away the Court's
jurisdiction in Ex parte McCardle, deliberately
to forestall a decision on the constitutionality
of the Reconstruction Acts." 11
We cannot know what would have happened
if the Court in Milligan had confined itself to
the precise issue before it. If Fairman is correct, itis possible that Davis' dictum may have
saved the Court from a politically damaging
decision which would have destroyed Recon-

struction. It is certain, however, that Davis'
unnecessary discussion of legislative power
weakened the respect for the Court and exposed
it to severe attacks at a time when its reputation was already low.
Although the justices often attain their positions by virtue of political involvement, they
should avoid it once they are in office. The
dignity of the Court dropped still further during Chase's term as Chief Justice as a result
of the political machinations of several of the
justices, especially Chase himself. Fairman
chronicles in loving detail Chase's fruitless
quest for the Presidency. His political desires
apparently led him to compromise his convictions. In pursuit of the Democratic presidential
nomination, he abandoned his previously stated
opinion that the Thirteenth Amendment gave
Congress power to promulgate universal suffrage. Upon Chase's death, the judgments of
his peers often focused on his failure as a justice because of his presidential ambitions. For
instance, Harpers Weekly, while eulogizing
Chase on one page, stated on another, with
respect to his successor, that it hoped he
would be one who "[would] find all his powers
engaged and his ambition fully satisfied with
the proper duties of his office." 18
The model for a judge goes beyond concern
for individual behavior; avoiding dicta, politics and partiality, he should also demonstrate
concern for the institution of the Court in the
processes of collective· decision-making. Here
again, the Court fared badly during this
period, failing to be sufficiently sensitive to
the problems posed by Justice Grier's poor
health. Grier's mental and physical decline is
portrayed in excerpts from his letters and
comments of his contemporaries, culminating
in this description of Grier during his last days
on the bench: "[Justices Sayne, Nelson and
Davis] are greatly exercised at his [Grier's]
not resigning - They declared they were going to crowd him about December 1, '69. He
sleeps on the bench, drops his head down and
looks very badly. Congress will also crowd him
if he don't resign."I 9
Despite the apparent decline in Grier's
mental ability and his imminent retirement,
the Court pressed on to a decision in Hepburn
v. Griswold20 (which depended on his vote)
that the Legal Tender Act was unconstitutional as applied to debts contracted before its
enactment. The decision was announced on the
same day that President Grant nominated two
new pro-Legal Tender justices, Strong and
Bradley, to the Court. Further, Grier's vote
with the majority was subject to great question. He apparently changed his vote in conference because of inconsistencies between his
then current opinion and remarks he had made
earlier in a related case. Fairman suggests
that Grier initially thought that the Legal
'fender Act should not be construed to apply
VOL, III
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to pre-existing debts, but that Congress could
have constitutionally made it do so, and that in
his vote he simply lost his wayP It is intriguing to speculate why the Court proceeded to
a decision. Chase may have felt the peculiar
zeal of the reformed sinner in getting the Legal
Tender Act declared unconstitutional, for it
was he, as Secretary of the Treasury, who first
sanctioned the measure. Perhaps he also hoped
to utilize Hepburn and the doctrine of stare
decisis to silence the convictions of his new colleagues. Fairman suggests that the Court
should have awaited the arrival of the new
justices and called for reargument, primarily
because he feels that it was inappropriate to
render an opinion on such a momentous matter,
based on the vote of a "confused mind." 22 The
Court's reversal of its decision on Legal Tender
in the same term made the first decision appear
a grave mistake, and dealt another crippling
blow to the Court's prestige as a disinterested
and impartial judicial body. 23
Adherence to the classical judicial model
does not, in and of itself, bring respect to the
Court. Such respect also depends upon the perception of the justices, the condition of society
and a degree of good luck. Departure from
these standards may at some time prove to be
the better wisdom. But before these notions
of judicial propriety are discarded as outmoded
expedients to preserve a fledgling institution,

we need to understand more thoroughly how
they arose. To this understanding of ourselves
and our institutions, Professor Fairman has
made a worthy contribution.
Footnotes
See Editor's Note, supra.
392 u.s. 409 (1968).
3
C. FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 186488, PART ONE 1297 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
FAIRMAN].
• !d. at 1297.
• Id. at 1256.
• Id. at 1258.
7
Id. at 1258n.160.
• 7 Wall. 506 (1869).
°10FAIRMAN at 510.
See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the
1

2

Jurisdict-ion of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953); A. Bickel, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
11
FAIRMAN at 514.
12
304 u.s. 64 (1938).
13
P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 29 (1961).
14
FAIRMAN at 920.
"'4 Wall. 2 (1866).
16
FAIRMAN at 208.
17
!d. at 237.
18
I d. at 1474n.357.
19
I d. at 728.
20
8 Wall. 603 (1870).
21
FAIRMAN at 718-91.
22
Id. at 719.
22
See C. HUGHES, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES (1928).
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The Superlawyers.
By Joseph C. Goulden.
Weybright and Talley, Inc., New York: 1972. Pp. 408, including index; lji8.95.
Some very forceful books have been written
by starting from an assumption which is not,
and perhaps cannot be, proven and building
upon that assumption an imposing superstructure. If the reader's attention is directed
toward the development at the top, he may
never think to question the basic assumption.
Such a method makes it easy to identify the
good guys from the bad ones. It leads to strong
writing. I suspect that much of the effectiveness of the early muckraking analyses of corporate misdeeds, such as Matthew Josephson's
The Robber Barons and Max Lowenthal's The
Investor Pays, arises from this device.
The Superlawyers is really built on the assumption that business enterprise is anti-social,
that what is good for General Motors is necessarily bad for the United States and that the
enemy of the consumer is the producer. The
opposite of corporate interest is public interest.
In a sense, the book follows the line of The
Greening of America without attempting to
support its thesis as Professor Reich does. Perhaps Mr. Goulden's assumptions can be established, but this is at least arguable.
It is hard to judge how interesting or useful
the book is to one totally unfamiliar with
practice in Washington. I came to Washington
forty years ago. During those years I have
been employed in both the federal departments
and the agencies. For a period I even tried,
not very successfully, to be a "Washington
lawyer" as Mr. Goulden uses the term. I am
acquainted more or less intimately with all of
the main characters in the book and with many
of the minor ones. Thus you should weigh
what I have written in lieu of my subjective
disappointment that my friends are portrayed
so unflatteringly.
As you may gather, Mr. Goulden's superlawyers do not come off too well. By and large,
they are portrayed as a conscienceless bunch,
grabbing for and getting more than their share
of the world's goods, and leaving the public
with the deficit. The best thing said for them
is that they are smart, albeit tricky smart. It
isn't, however, the Washington lawyer who
fares worst in this exposition, but really the
administrative agency, or perhaps the administrative process itself. Seemingly, it is assumed
that the whole process is business oriented
and that unless the consumer-crusaders push
agencies to the wall, public interest will generally be ignored. This is a sad appraisal of
the federal commissions and departments. To
be sure, it is a common complaint as to so~e
agencies, all of the time, and as to all of the
agencies, some of the time. To generalize as
to all administrators in this way, however, is

unfair. An excellent example is William W.
Goodrich, formerly of the F.D.A. From my
own personal experience, I would give him high
marks for long service with the Food and
Drug Administration where I observed that
he fought many a good fight for the consumer. Mr. Goulden doesn't say anything to the
contrary; all he does say is that, after resigning as General Counsel of the Food and Drug
Administration, he became president of a trade
association.
Many years ago when I worked for the
Securities and Exchange Commission, I had a
good deal to do with the early attempts to
regulate corporate proxy practices. As I remember it, we didn't think of ourselves as a
quasi-judicial body, but as an administrative
arm of the government carrying out a Congressional policy. This policy was to afford
investors a measure of protection by requiring
that disclosures be made to them when they
were asked for their proxies for corporate
meetings or for approval of corporate action.
There were consumer-crusaders even in those
remote days and among them was a Mr. Gilbert who used to push and prod us into action.
I believe that he and his kind served a real
purpose, but I would hate to think that they
were at the core of the regulation. The best
way to get better protection for investors, or
consumers, or the general public is to use care
in the selection of Commissioners and to build
up their staffs. It is not practicable to rely on
outsiders who, with the exception of Mr.
Nader, have insufficient means and personnel
to dig out the dirt themselves. A few years
ago, Mr. Elman, one of Mr. Goulden's good
guys and a former Commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission, expressed the feeling
that his agency could not perform the function
assigned to it. But with recent changes in the
leadership and with new staff, the agency is
now reputed to be making good progress in the
public interest.
The Superlawyers is full of accurately presented facts and case histories. It is also full
of innuendo. Mr. Goulden often does not spell
out his conclusions; he states what he finds in
the record or what he has been told and assumes that the reader will draw his own conclusions, presumably unfavorable ones. Take
as an example, Covington and Burling's handling of the electrical equipment price fixing
case in which a plea of nolo contendere was
made by General Electric in exchange for
statements by the Department of Justice exonerating the top management. Consider also the
consent decree agreed to by the automobile
manufacturers under Mr. Cutler's guidance in
order to terminate the government's suit to
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enjoin a conspiracy to postpone installation of
antipollution devices. The implications are that
there was something wrong in the lawyers'
making the best possible deal with the government for their corporate clients when the public interest was involved (the settlement prevented a full trial on the merits and the amassing of a record for triple damage suits).
I wonder how Mr. Goulden reacts to a guilty
plea for an individual defendant in order to
obtain a lesser penalty. For example, compare
Heidi Fletcher's plea in the felony murder case
where a D.C. policeman was killed during a
bank holdup. Was it Mr. Williams' job to protect his client, or the public interest, or are
they really part of the same thing? Mr. Goulden
well knows that a lawyer, whether he be a
Washington lawyer, or from Baltimore, or
Philadelphia, and whether his client be an indigent individual or the Bank of America, and
whether the offense be homicide or a violation
of the antitrust laws, must advise and work for
the optimum outcome from the point of view
of his client; it is the job of the prosecutor and
of the court to protect the public interest. Mr.
Goulden can explain better than I that this is
how the adversary system is supposed to work.
Some lawyers want no part in that kind of
business, but once in it they cannot avoid their
obligations.
Similarly, Mr. Goulden cites Mr. Clifford's
effectiveness in obtaining tax relief for well-

to-do investors and foundations faced with the
necessity of disposing of securities by reason
of the du Pont-General Motors divestment decree. It does not seem to have even remotely
occurred to Mr. Goulden that such relief
could have been more in the spirit of the law
than the collection of huge taxes on the basis
of a forced sale.
If the reader of The Superlawyers happens
to be a newly accredited lawyer seeking a place
to practice, he should not write off Washington
on the basis of this book. My own law school
class was turned loose on the world at the
very bottom of the 1929 depression. Jobs in
the large city corporate offices of New York
were practically non-existent. As a result, that
portion of the class which would ordinarily
have gravitated there came instead to Washington. Thirty or more of us are still in D.C.
The statistics from the booklet prepared for
our fortieth reunion make it appear that many
have done well financially and some have done
tremendously well in government service.
However, no member of my class is named by
Mr. Goulden as a "superlawyer." So, if the
reader likes the Washington climate and believes that federal practice, in or out of the
government, is his dish, there appears to be
plenty of room to work and earn a living in
Washington without being named as one of
Mr. Goulden's antiheroes.
JOHN F. DAVIS

The Paper Chase
By John Jay Osborn, Jr.
Houghton-Mifflin Company, Boston: 1971. Pp. 181 ; $4.95.
Although legal education and its impact on
law students has been examined and criticized
in recent years by teachers, lawyers, psychiatrists, and even Ralph Nader, the penetrating
( ?) gaze of the novelist has been surprisingly
absent from this scrutiny. Now an attempt
has been made to fill that gap. While The
Paper Chase has its good moments, mainly due
to a few social observations and fine classroom
scenes (I especially liked one memorializing
the first day of classes, which astonished me
by making me feel a bit nostalgic - What!
Nostalgic for law school?!), the novel's failings render it useless as an aid to understanding the ills of legal education, and worse, make
the book dull and generally poor entertainment.
The Paper Chase is a chronicle of the first
year experience of a Minnesota lad named Hart
at Harvard Law School (alas, the book is unabashedly about Harvard). The chronicle centers on an affair Hart is having with a Radcliffe drop-out named Susan, daughter of Law
Professor Kingsfield; the persons in Hart's
study group; and Hart's experiences in his con-

tracts class, taught by none other - unbelievably - than Kingsfield, a grandmaster of the
Socratic method.
The affair between Hart and Susan is a
rocky one, but the conflict between them is
simple: Susan is trying to lead Hart down
the primrose path of neo-Keroacian existentialism which Hart's good heartland-of-America soul resists strenuously. A sample of the
dialogue:
She sat down beside him in the stand.
" . . . Why the hell can't you just do
things?"
"I am trying to do something," he said
into the wind. "I'm trying to make sense.
For Christ's sake, what's wrong with that?
I just want us to get together."
He'd lose her either way. If he did nothing, the summer would finish them.
"Hart," she said, "I like you. I really
do."
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"Then why the hell can't we love each
other?" he shot back. "I can't live this
way. I need to be organized. I need a way
of living I can rationalize. I can't sleep.
I'm going to flunk all my courses. I won't
pass."
And so forth. The reasons why Susan wants
to "do things" and why Hart wants to "get
organized" are, however, not clear. Indeed, as
is the case with all the figures in The Paper
Chase, there is no development of character;
lacking depth and discernible motivation, the
characters of the novel merely populate epi.
sodic sketches of life at Harvard/Cambridge.
Unfortunately, the sketches are also lacking
in realism. Hart's study group, for example,
is composed of some of the strangest people
seen this side of Love Story. There is Ander·
son who takes the "maximum utility" approach
to studying and has a year-long schedule to
insure that he achieves that goal, Bell who
compulsively prepares an 800-page outline of
his property course and ignores his other subjects, and Kevin who flunks all his practice
exams ("unusual") and then tries to commit
suicide. (The brief vignettes of Kevin's wife
are, by the way, one of the few things in the
book which ring true. One of the more surprising things in law school was the rather low
calibre of the law wives, there being no law
husbands in those far-gone days. To paraphrase Mrs. Holmes: Harvard is full of good
students and women they married when they

were young. Why this is so is not clear. Were
my classmates over·achievers who needed security of hard-working, dull wives? Were they
achievers because they were married? Are law
students inherently too dull to be effective
competitors in the marriage market?)
Caricatures such as Anderson, Bell and
Kevin flesh out Osborn's descriptions of law
school as a super-competitive, tense and lonely
'
place:
Hart left, walking fast, conscious that
bored students were watching him, knowing that he was leaving as another piece
of data in their decisions: I beat him. I
studied longer. Well, I don't have to worry
about Hart. He can't even stay in the Ji.
brary after eleven.
While I felt that the resulting picture is far
more bleak than the real thing, the main problem with the book is that it fails to identify
the causes and motives underlying that bleak·
ness. Is it, for example, a problem endemic to
academia, unique to law schools, or unique only
to Osborn's characters? Presented in vacuo,
the author's descriptions and criticisms are of
no help in understandling the beast under scrutiny. And because the characters cannot be
understood, they do not stir the reader. When
those flaws are coupled with tired dialogue,
the combination can be less than stimulating.
Such is The Paper Chase.
WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, II
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The
MARYLAND LAW FORUM
500 W. BALTIMORE ST., BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201

Althoug,h circulation of the Forum was previously restricted to members
of the academic community of the University of Maryland School of law,
subscriptions are no,w available to the public. Articles of contemporary
socio-legal si~nificance have already been featured by such distinguished
i'ndividuals as retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark, U. S. Senator
Charles Mathias, a,nthropologist lionel Tiger, Maryland State Se,nator
Rosalie Abrams, Washington, D. C.'s Stern Community law Firm Director,
Monroe H. Freedman, a~nd many, many more.
The Forum is a joumal devoted essentially to matters of contemporary
legal a.nd social significance of immediate interest to the student, profession.al and community at large. Earlier articles have centered around
such issues as involuntary civil commitment, rent escrow, the rights of
the retarded citizen, the challenge of corrections and environme,ntal
controversies.
The Forum is published four times per year at a cost of $7.50 per year.
Subscriptions may be enfered by returning the coupon below or :by calling
(30 I) 528-7554.

PLEASE
MAKE ALL
CHECKS
PAYABLE
TO THE
MARYLAND
LAW
FORUM

Name ......................................................................................................
Address ...................................................................................................

Mail to:
0 Payment enclosed

o

Bill me
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LERNER LAW BOOK CO., INC.

LLB

1220 NORTH CHARLES STREET

~~

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21201
TELEPHONE (30 I) 685-7377

LAW STUDENT HEAD9UARTERS FOR NEW
AND USED CASEBOOKS. TEXTBOOKS. HORNBOOKS.
AND EVERY MAJOR LEGAL STUDY AID.
*

GILBERTS OUTLINES

*

AMERICAN LEGAL CASE DIGESTS

*CAMBRIDGE LAW STUDY AIDS
*

LEGALINES

*LANDMARK LAW SUMMARIES
*

SMITH"S LAW REVIEW

*LEGAL FORMS AND STATIONERY

PROMPT ATTENTION TO PHONE ORDERS.
WE HAVE THE BOOKS YOU NEED.

COURSES FOR THE MULTI-STATE BAR EXAMINATION
AT BALTIMORE AND SILVER SPRING
The area of coverage on each subject on the Multi-State Examination is national in
scope and not limited to Maryland law.
The instructors, for many years, have extensive experience in preparation of students
for bar examinations with the greatest success in that field.
Enrollment for both the February and July, 1973 examinations are now being received.

THE MOST SUCCESSFUL COURSES FOR THE
MARYLAND BAR EXAMINATIONS

GINSBERG & GINSBERG
BAR REVIEW COURSES
SUITE 402

306 N. CHARLES ST. • BALTIMORE. MD.
TELEPHONE: 1301) 539·4750
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HELP.

. when you need it, there's a system for you. It's based on a number. It will save
hours of time-killing research. You will find the number in your state, regional, or general Key Number Di·
gest. That number not only pinpoints all cases on your point in your jurisdiction, but every jurisdiction . . .
regardless of date or Key Number Digest. And then through numerous library references, case and statute cita·
tions in the Digest, you are instantly in command of other pertinent authority. Before you know it, all the law is
at your fingertips. And it all starts with a number. We called it the KEY NUMBER. It's the system for lawyers
who want to spend less time on research.
WEST PUBLISHING CO.
E. N. deRussy, 7612 Club Road, Ruxton, Maryland 21204, Phone: 301/825-1306
James D. Mulligan, P.O. Box 28115, Washington, D. C. · 20005, Phone: 202/638-2244
C. J. Pflieger, P.O. Box 30126, Bethesda, Maryland 20014, Phone: 301/530-7980
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